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THOMAS J . PRUSA*
Rutgers University and NBER
LUCA RUBINI**
University of Birmingham
Abstract: This paper analyzes the dispute between Korea and the United States
regarding the method of calculating anti-dumping duties. The case mirrors other
recent WTO disputes involving zeroing. Even though it ceased zeroing in original
investigations in December 2006, the United States implemented the policy change
only prospectively. As a result, the margins applied to the products in this dispute
remained unchanged because they had been calculated prior to the policy change.
The United States did not contest Korea’s claims. The Panel conﬁrmed that zeroing
was used and, following the long line of Panel and Appellate Body rulings, found
the practice inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. After the Panel
Report was adopted, the United States recalculated the margins without zeroing.
It, however, refused to refund unliquidated cash deposits that were based on
zeroing, highlighting the United States’s continued lukewarm compliance with
WTO rulings on zeroing. This dispute offers an opportunity to ponder on
weaknesses of the WTO Dispute Settlement and the ability of one Member to
take advantage of it. Since the facts and their legal assessment were undisputed,
why was litigation necessary? Can compliance with WTO law be improved with
broader ﬁndings and more incisive remedies?
[I]nternational legal arrangements have relatively more in common with the law
of primitive societies studied by anthropologists, in which litigation is still
emerging as a rather tenuous alternative to dispute resolution by force.
International litigation is an institution of indeterminate character. It is not an
inevitable response to legal disputes, nor does it supply a conclusive outcome.1
* Email: prusa@econ.rutgers.edu.
** Email: l.rubini@bham.ac.uk.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and all omissions and errors are also of the
authors. We would like to thank Dukgeun Ahn, Sungioon Cho, Jim Durling, Gary Horlick, Rob Howse
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1 Robert E. Hudec (1987), ‘“Transcending the Ostensible”: Some Reﬂections on the Nature of
Litigation Between Governments’, 72Minnesota Law Review, 211, 212–213.
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1. Introduction
United States –Use of Zeroing in Anti-Dumping Measures Involving
Products from Korea2 is another WTO dispute involving the United States’s
practice of zeroing negative dumping margins in calculating overall weighted-
average margins of dumping.3 In this dispute, the measures at issue are the
ﬁnal determinations, amended ﬁnal determinations, anti-dumping duty
orders, and amended anti-dumping duty orders imposed by the United States
in relation to imports of the three products: stainless-steel plate in coils
(SSPC), stainless-steel sheet and strip in coils (SSSSC), and diamond sawblades
(DS).4
At ﬁrst blush, the dispute is seemingly superﬂuous because the United States
[US] ceased zeroing in original investigations [OI] almost three years before Korea
requested consultations.5 Why would Korea complain about zeroing when
the US had already stopped zeroing? The conﬂict hinges on the particular way the
US changed its domestic law to eliminate zeroing. Although the US stopped zeroing
in OI in December 2006, it did so only prospectively; that is, the US’s new rules
only apply to margin calculations performed after the implementation date.6
According to the US, all anti-dumping [AD] margins computed prior to the date of
its policy change, including the margins in this dispute, were unaffected by the
WTO’s prior determinations.
US–Zeroing (Korea) has many parallels with US–PET Bags (Thailand).7 While
the current dispute is somewhat more complicated thanUS−PET Bags (Thailand),
2United States –Use of Zeroing in Anti-Dumping Measures Involving Products from Korea, WT/
DS402/R, adopted 24 February 2011 (hereafter, US–Zeroing (Korea)).
3 Over the past decade, the WTO Appellate Body has heard at least 20 disputes involving various types
of zeroing and each time has found that the practice violates the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement. All but
two of the cases have involved the United States as respondent. For a review of WTO cases involving
zeroing, see Chad P. Bown and Thomas J. Prusa (2011), ‘US Anti-Dumping: Much Ado about Zeroing’, in
William J. Martin and Aaditya Mattoo (eds.), Unﬁnished Business? The WTO’s Doha Agenda, London:
CEPR and the World Bank, pp. 355–392.
4US–Zeroing (Korea), para. 2.1.
5 ‘Anti-Dumping Proceedings: Calculation of the Weighted-Average Dumping Margin During
an Anti-Dumping Investigation, Final Modiﬁcation’, Federal Register, 71: 248 (27 December 2006),
pp. 77722–77725 (hereafter, ‘2006 Modiﬁcation’). The effective date of this ﬁnal modiﬁcation was 16
January 2007.
6 To be more precise, the 2006 Modiﬁcation reads: ‘The Department will apply this ﬁnal modiﬁcation
in all current and future antidumping investigations as of the effective date.’ All three cases in this dispute
had their OI margins calculated prior to this date and hence were not subject to the new rules.
7 Panel Report, United States –Anti-Dumping Measures on Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from
Thailand, WT/DS383/R, adopted 18 February 2010, DSR 2010:IV, 1841 (hereafter, US–PET Bags
(Thailand)). For an analysis of that dispute, see Thomas J. Prusa and Edwin Vermulst (2012), ‘United
States –Anti-Dumping Measures on Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from Thailand: A Cat in the Bag’,
11:2 World Trade Review, 257–271.
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the raison d’être for both disputes is identical8 – the US Department of Commerce
[USDOC] will calculate non-zeroed margins for preexisting cases only after an
adverse ﬁnding for each particular case. In both US–Zeroing (Korea) and US–PET
Bags (Thailand), all evidence indicates that the US perceived it had no chance
to prevail at the WTO Dispute Settlement Body [DSB]. In its prior decisions, the
WTO Appellate Body [AB] unfailingly had found zeroing to be inconsistent
with the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement [ADA].9 The US did not contest the
claims in either US–Zeroing (Korea) or US–PET Bags (Thailand). In fact, the US
acknowledged it had used zeroing when calculating dumping margins in both
disputes. Yet, in both disputes the US refused to recalculate the margins upon
receipt of the consultation request. As best we can tell, US–Zeroing (Korea) and
US–PET Bags (Thailand) were both legal formalities required by USDOC’s narrow
implementation of WTO rules.
The timing of events highlights the basis for the dispute. As seen in Table 1, the
USDOC made ﬁnal AD margin calculations for all three cases prior to the policy
change. In SSPC and SSSSC, the order was in effect long before the USDOC policy
change; however, due to legal challenges involving the injury determination, the
DS AD order went into effect after the policy change (but, as noted, the USDOC
had calculated the OI AD margin before the December 2006 policy change).
In this dispute, Korea challenged the US’s continued use of zeroing. On
24 November 2009, Korea requested consultations with the US (Table 2).
Consultations were held in December 2009 and February 2010, but failed to
resolve the dispute. Korea requested the establishment of a Panel in April 2010.
Table 1. Key dates in US proceedings
Product
SSPC SSSSC DS
Petition Initiated 27 April 1998 13 July 1998 21 June 2005
Final OI AD Duty 31 March 1999 8 June 1999 22 May 2006
(W-W method) (amended 28 August 2001) (amended 28
August 2001)
(amended 24 March 2010)
Final Injury 12 May 1999 28 July 1999 11 July 2006 (remanded
13 January 2009)
AD Order 21 May 1999 (amended
11 March 2003, 2 April 2003,
and 24 April 2003)
27 July 1999 4 November 2009
8 Two issues make this dispute somewhat more complicated. First, unlike US–PET Bags (Thailand)
there was not a pre-dispute agreement as to how the Panel’s decision would be implemented. Second, this
dispute involves three cases rather than just a single claim.
9 Bown and Prusa, ‘US Anti-Dumping’, Table 14.2, supra at note 3.
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The ﬁnal Panel Report was circulated in January 2011 and adopted by the DSB
in February 2011. In March 2011, the US announced it intended to implement the
DSB’s recommendations. Korea and the US were able to agree on the ‘reasonable
period of time’ for implementation by July 2011. The US recalculated the margins
on DS in October 2011 and on SSPC and SSSSC in November 2011. On
8 December 2011, the US reported to the DSB that it had ‘fully implemented’
the DSB’s recommendations and rulings. While not within the scope of the
investigation, Korea requested that the US refund unliquidated cash deposits based
on the zeroed margins. To date, the US has refused to do so.
Given that (i) the dispute covers extremely well-trodden ground,10 (ii) neither
party challenged the Panel to push the envelope on zeroing, and (iii) the Panel’s
reasoning simply restated previous AB and Panel opinions, we ﬁnd ourselves
with little to say about zeroing beyond what has been previously stated. Instead,
Table 2. Key dates in WTO dispute
Event Date
Korea requests consultations 24 November 2009
US and Korea fail to resolve dispute
in consultations
December 2009 to February 2010
Korea requests WTO Panel 08 April 2010
Final Panel Report circulated 18 January 2011
Final Panel Report adopted 24 February 2011
‘Reasonable period of time’ for implementation
established
17 June 2011
New AD duties implemented October 2011 and
November 2011
US refuses to recalculate margins for unliquidated
cash deposits
February 2012
10 Legal and economic summaries of previous zeroing disputes include Merit E. Janow and Robert
W. Staiger (2003), ‘European Communities –Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed
Linen from India’, in Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis (eds.), The WTO Case Law of 2001,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Gene M. Grossman and Alan O. Sykes (2006), ‘European
Communities –Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India: Recourse to
Article 21.5 of the DSU by India’, in Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis (eds.), The WTO Case Law of
2003, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Chad P. Bown and Alan O. Sykes (2008), ‘The Zeroing
Issue: A Critical Analysis of Softwood V’, 7:1 World Trade Review, 121–142; Thomas J. Prusa and
Edwin Vermulst (2009), ‘A One-Two Punch on Zeroing: US–Zeroing (EC) and US –Zeroing (Japan)’, 8:1
World Trade Review, 187–241; Meredith Crowley and Robert Howse (2010), ‘US–Stainless Steel
(Mexico)’, 9:1 World Trade Review, 117–150; Bernard Hoekman and Jasper Wauters (2011), ‘US
Compliance with WTO Rulings on Zeroing in Anti-Dumping’, 10:1 World Trade Review, 5–43; Thomas
J. Prusa and Edwin Vermulst (2011), ‘United States –Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing
Methodology: The End of Zeroing?’, 10:1 World Trade Review, 45–61; Prusa and Vermulst, ‘United
States –Anti-Dumping Measures on Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from Thailand’, supra at note 7.
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our commentary will focus on three subordinate issues. First, how should the
Panels handle undisputed claims? What is the real issue with such claims? Second,
what does the US’s insistence on adverse ﬁnding before it will recalculate margins
imply for the WTO DSU, its remedies, and other member countries? Third, is it
reasonable to expect the US to refund unliquidated cash deposits that were based
on OI margins calculated with zeroing?
In the next section, we review the claims and summarize the Panel’s ﬁndings.
Next, we discuss how the US implemented the Panel’s recommendations. We then
offer commentary on the ancillary issues associated with this dispute.
2. Claims and Panel ﬁndings
Zeroing refers to the practice of replacing the actual amounts of dumping that yield
negative dumping margins with a value of zero prior to the ﬁnal calculation of a
weighted-average margin of dumping for the product under investigation with
respect to the exporters under investigation. Zeroing drops transactions that have
negative margins from the numerator and hence increases overall dumping margins
and the resulting size of the applied anti-dumping duty.11 While there are several
forms of zeroing,12 the present case concerned the relatively simple form of model
zeroing under the weighted-average-to-weighted-average comparison method in
original investigations.
Korea claimed that the USDOC had used the model-zeroing methodology to
determine the ﬁnal dumping margins for individually investigated Korean
exporters whose margins of dumping were not based on total facts available, in
violation of Article 2.4.2 of the ADA.13 In particular, Korea claimed that the
USDOC (i) identiﬁed different ‘models’, i.e., types, of products based on the most
relevant product characteristics; (ii) calculated weighted-average prices in the US
and weighted-average normal values in the comparison market on a model-speciﬁc
basis for the entire period of investigation; (iii) compared the weighted-average
normal value of each model to the weighted-average US price for that same model;
(iv) calculated the dumping margin for an exporter by summing up the amount of
dumping for each model and then dividing it by the aggregated US price for all
models; and (v) set to zero all negative margins on individual models before
summing the total amount of dumping for all models.14
The US did not contest Korea’s claims. It acknowledged the accuracy of Korea’s
description of the USDOC’s use of zeroing and recognized that in US–Softwood
11 Prusa and Vermulst, ‘A One-Two Punch on Zeroing’, supra at note 10, provide an extended
discussion of how zeroing affects the calculated margin.
12 See, e.g., ibid.; Edwin Vermulst and Daniel Ikenson (2007), ‘Zeroing under the WTOAnti-Dumping
Agreement: Where Do We Stand?’, 2:6 Global Trade and Customs Journal, 231–242.
13US–Zeroing (Korea), paras. 2.2–2.7.
14 Ibid., para. 7.3.
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Lumber V15 the AB found that the use of zeroing with respect to the average-
to-average comparison methodology in investigations was inconsistent with Article
2.4.2 by interpreting the terms ‘margins of dumping’ and ‘all comparable export
transactions’ in an integrated manner. The US also acknowledged that reasoning
was equally applicable in the present case.16
The Panel considered that the issues raised in the present case were very similar to
those addressed by the Panels inUS–Shrimp (Ecuador),17US–Shrimp (Thailand),18
and US–PET Bags (Thailand) and agreed with the approach adopted by those
Panels.19
The Panel then ﬁrst considered its role under Article 11 of the DSU, in light of the
fact that the US did not contest Korea’s claim. Article 11 of the DSU describes
the role of Panels in DSB proceedings requiring that the ‘Panel should make an
objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of
the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant
covered agreements and make such other ﬁndings as will assist the DSB in making
the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered
agreements’. Notwithstanding the US’s decision not to contest Korea’s claim, the
Panel explained that it was bound by Article 11 of the DSU to make ‘its own
objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of
the facts and the applicability of and conformity with the covered agreements as
required by Article 11 of the DSU’.20
The Panel consequently adopted the approach followed by the Panel in US–
Shrimp (Ecuador).21 The Panel thus reasoned that, in the absence of effective
refutation by the defending party, it is still required for the complaining party to
present a prima facie case. The Panel could thus only rule in favor of Korea if it was
satisﬁed that Korea had made a prima facie case regarding its zeroing claim.22
In order to establish that the USDOC zeroed in the present case, Korea referred
to a computer program used by the USDOC to calculate dumping margins.
The Panel found, in that respect, that the computer program indeed indicated
the use of zeroing by the USDOC. The Panel furthermore repeated that the US had
15Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from
Canada, WT/DS264/AB/R, adopted 31 August 2004, DSR 2004:V, 1875 (hereafter, US–Softwood
Lumber V).
16US–Zeroing (Korea), para. 3.2.
17 Panel Report, United States –Anti-Dumping Measure on Shrimp from Ecuador, WT/DS335/R,
adopted on 20 February 2007, DSR 2007:II, 425 (hereafter, US–Shrimp (Ecuador)).
18 Panel Report, United States –Measures Relating to Shrimp from Thailand, WT/DS343/R, adopted
1 August 2008, as modiﬁed by Appellate Body Report WT/DS343/AB/R, WT/DS345/AB/R, DSR 2008:
VII, 2539 (hereafter, US–Shrimp (Thailand)).
19US–Zeroing (Korea), para. 7.17.
20 Ibid., para. 7.8.
21US–Shrimp (Ecuador), paras. 7.7–7.11.
22US–Zeroing (Korea), para. 7.19.
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acknowledged the accuracy of Korea’s description of the USDOC’s use of zeroing.
The Panel therefore concluded that it was satisﬁed that Korea had demonstrated
that the USDOC zeroed in the measure at issue.23
The Panel then veriﬁed whether Korea had established that the methodology
used by the USDOC was indeed the same in all legally relevant aspects as the
methodology reviewed by the Appellate Body in US–Softwood Lumber V. Korea
relied on the description of the methodology used in the USDOC’s notice of
preliminary determination of sales at less than fair value, as well as the computer
program used to determine the dumping margins. According to the Panel, this was
sufﬁcient evidence to establish that the USDOC performed the actions as claimed
by Korea in points (i) to (v) above.24
The Panel considered that the absence of any denial by the US and the above-
mentioned evidence established that Korea had demonstrated that the methodology
applied by the USDOC in calculating the margins of dumping that were not based
on total facts available was the same as the methodology that the Appellate Body in
US–Softwood Lumber V had found to be inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the
ADA.25
Finally, the Panel veriﬁed whether Korea had established that the methodology
applied by the USDOC was inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the ADA. The Panel
considered, in that respect, that while it was not strictly speaking bound by the
reasoning in prior Panel or AB Reports,26 adopted Reports do create ‘legitimate
expectations’ among WTO members and found that following the AB conclusions
in earlier Reports would not only be appropriate but would also be what would be
expected, especially where the issues are the same.27
The Panel referred to the Panel Report in US–Shrimp (Ecuador) with regard
to the AB’s reasoning in US–Softwood Lumber V concerning the compatibility of
zeroing with Article 2.4.2 of the ADA.28 The AB in US–Softwood Lumber V had
found that it was clear from the texts of Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 and Article
2.1 of the ADA that dumping is assessed in relation to the product as a whole as
deﬁned by an investigating authority and cannot be found to exist only for a type,
model, or category of that product. The AB in US–Softwood Lumber V on that
basis concluded that the treatment of comparisons for which the weighted-average
normal value is less than the weighted-average export price as ‘non-dumped’
comparisons was not in accordance with the requirements of Article 2.4.2 of
the ADA.
23 Ibid., para. 7.22.
24 Ibid., paras. 7.23–7.26.
25 Ibid., para. 7.27.
26 Since ‘there is not a system of precedent within the WTO dispute settlement system’, US–Zeroing
(Korea), para. 7.31.
27 Ibid., para. 7.30.
28US–Shrimp (Ecuador), paras. 7.38–7.39.
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The Panel also noted that the Panel in US–Shrimp (Ecuador) found that there
was a consistent line of AB Reports that holds that zeroing in the context of the
weighted-average-to-average methodology in original investigations was inconsis-
tent with Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.29
The Panel therefore concluded that given that the issues raised in the present case
were identical in all material respects to those addressed by the AB inUS–Softwood
Lumber V, Korea had established a prima facie case that the use of zeroing by the
USDOC was inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the ADA, because the USDOC did
not calculate those dumping margins on the basis of the product as a whole, taking
into account all comparable export transactions.30
3. US implementation
With the adverse WTO Panel ruling, the USDOC proceeded to recalculate the
AD margins. On 17 June 2011, Korea and the US informed the WTO that they had
mutually agreed that the US would comply with the Panel’s recommendations
and rulings no later than 1 December 2011.31 On 19 December 2011, the US
reported that it had fully implemented the Panel’s recommendations and rulings
within the reasonable period of time agreed by the parties.32
The table below (Table 3) summarizes the dumping margins with and without
zeroing. The order on diamond sawblades and stainless-steel plate in coils was
revoked; both participating ﬁrms in stainless-steel sheet and strip in coils had their
AD order revoked; however, because one Korean ﬁrm (Taihan) did not participate,
margins for that ﬁrm were based on facts available and a duty remains in place.
While the US implemented the AB ruling, the fact that the US requested
six months to recalculate the margins reﬂects its continued foot dragging with
respect to zeroing decisions. We imagine that only a few minutes were needed for
the USDOC to re-run its AD margins computer program with the zeroing code
commented out. Yet, the US took months to implement.33
Moreover, the US already knew (at least) in November 2009 (when the
consultations with Korea started) it would have to recalculate the margins. Yet,
it refused to do so until months after the Panel made its perfunctory decision.
This allowed it to levy zeroing-distorted margins for another 24 months after the
consultations request.
29US–Zeroing (Korea), para. 7.34.
30 Ibid., paras. 8.1–8.2.
31US–Zeroing (Korea), WT/DS402/6, 22 June 2011.
32US–Zeroing (Korea), WT/DS402/7, 9 December 2011.
33 The fact that Korea accepted and agreed to this time frame as ‘reasonable’ suggests that it could not
do anything to force the US to implement more promptly. Nor, arguably, could the WTO DSU. Although
obviously from a legal standpoint nothing prevents immediate implementation, the ‘reasonable period of
time’ to implement DSU obligations is the recognition of the political and practical adjustment required by
compliance.
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4. Analysis of Panel’s decision
Bown and Prusa document that between the ﬁrst zeroing dispute of 1998 and
early 2010 nearly 20 WTO disputes have involved zeroing.34 Consequently, there
are numerous WTO AB rulings on the issue and also a considerable body of legal
and economic analyses of zeroing.35
The key phrase is contained in Article 2.4.2 of the ADA:
the existence of margins of dumping during the investigation phase shall normally
be established on the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal value
Table 3. OI weighted-average anti-dumping duty margins, with and without
zeroing
Exporter/manufacturer
OI W. Avg. margin
(with zeroing)1 %
OI W. Avg. margin
(without zeroing)2 %
Diamond sawblades
Ehwa 8.80 0
Shinhan 16.88 0
Hyosung 6.43 0
All others 11.10 0
Stainless-steel plate in coils
Pohang Iron and Steel 6.08 0.55 (de minimis)
All others 6.08 0.55 (de minimis)
Stainless-steel sheet and strip in coils
Pohang Iron and Steel 2.49 0
Inchon Iron and Steel 0 0
Taihan Electric Wire 58.79 58.79
(facts available) (facts available)
All others 2.49 19.60
Notes: 1 Diamond Sawblades, from 71 Fed. Reg. 29310 (22 May 2006) and as amended 75 Fed.
Reg. 14126 (24 March 2010); Stainless Steel Plate in Coils and Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils
from 66 Fed. Reg. 45279 (28 August 2001).
2 Diamond Sawblades, from 76 Fed. Reg. 66892 (28 October 2011); Stainless Steel Plate in Coils
and Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from 76 Fed. Reg. 74771 (1 December 2011).
34 Bown and Prusa, ‘US Anti-Dumping’, supra at note 3.
35 Including Janow and Staiger, ‘European Communities –Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of
Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India’; Grossman and Sykes, ‘European Communities –Anti-Dumping Duties
on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India’; Bown and Sykes, ‘The Zeroing Issue’; Prusa and
Vermulst, ‘A One-Two Punch on Zeroing’; Prusa and Vermulst, ‘United States –Continued Existence and
Application of Zeroing Methodology’; Crowley and Howse, ‘US–Stainless Steel (Mexico)’; and Hoekman
and Wauters, ‘US Compliance with WTO Rulings on Zeroing in Anti-Dumping’ − see supra at note 10;
Prusa and Vermulst, ‘United States –Anti-Dumping Measures on Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from
Thailand’ – see supra at note 7.
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with a weighted average of prices of all comparable export transactions or by a
comparison of normal value and export prices on a transaction-to-transaction
basis.36
The case does not add much to the existing WTO rulings on zeroing. We agree
with Prusa and Vermulst who stated:
the Appellate Body was arguably correct in prohibiting the use of zeroing under
the main methods of Article 2.4.2 of the ADA37
and with Prusa and Vermulst who wrote:
We agree with the legal justiﬁcation logic behind the AB’s decisions – given that
this case largely follows the script developed in prior cases, this should not be
surprising. Further, as we have argued in the past, we also believe that standard
economic statistical inference methods demand that all transactions be included
in a ‘fair’ comparison.38
With nothing new to add to the existing commentary on zeroing, we instead
discuss several related issues in this case that raise broader questions with respect
to the WTO DSU system and build on Prusa and Vermulst who commented on the
very similar US–PET Bags (Thailand) decision.
4.1 The real issue of undisputed claims
Even though the US had not contested Korea’s claim, the Panel nevertheless
considered it necessary, in accordance with the approach of previous Panels,39 to
satisfy itself – albeit in a summary fashion – that Korea had discharged its burden of
proof, establishing a prima facie case. All this under Article 11 DSU, which requires
the Panel to make ‘an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an
objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity
with the relevant covered agreements and make such other ﬁndings as will assist
the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in
the covered agreements’.40 It therefore followed the analysis we have outlined in
Section 2 above.
The analysis covers some nine of the 17 pages of the Report, and most of it is
taken up by quotations from previous AB and Panel Reports.
36 Article 2.4.2, Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994.
37 Prusa and Vermulst, ‘A One-Two Punch on Zeroing’, p. 188, supra at note 10.
38 Prusa and Vermulst, ‘United States –Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing
Methodology’, pp. 46–47, supra at note 10.
39US–Shrimp (Ecuador); US–Shrimp (Thailand). Compare David Palmeter and Petros C. Mavroidis
(2004), Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization (second edn), Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, p. 145.
40US–Zeroing (Korea), para. 7.15.
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The Panel did ensure that a violation had occurred. This was made easy by the
uncontested nature of the facts and the clear and undisputed illegality of the
practice of zeroing. Indeed, the US’s recognition of the breach already signiﬁcantly
contributed to making the establishment of Korea’s prima facie case easier. In other
words, the threshold is naturally lower for complainants faced with undisputed
claims.
Thus, even though one could argue the necessity of analyzing an undisputed
claim, what can in fact be challenged is the depth of the assessment of the breach.
One could certainly envisage a more straightforward procedure, particularly in a
paradigmatically simple dispute such as this one. Arguably, as the EU suggested,
one step further could have been taken without any major breach of the rules of
evidence. In consideration of the undisputed description of facts and of their legal
assessment, the Panel might well have found that there was no dispute in the ﬁrst
place and move to its rulings and recommendations without much further ado.41
Whatever it may be, no serious analysis was required and indeed no signiﬁcant
clariﬁcation of the law made by the Panel. From an economic viewpoint, no
signiﬁcant amount of resources were used (or wasted) because of the Panel’s
analysis – but for time. And, in a context where compliance is taken to be only
prospective (and normally commences only after the expiration of a ‘reasonable
period’), time does matter.42
In other words, the fact that the claim was both factually and legally undisputed
raises other questions, going beyond the necessity for Panels to perform their
(in such circumstances) pretty straightforward review. Why, despite the parties
were in agreement with respect of the breach, was litigation necessary in the ﬁrst
place? Is it a desirable use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System? If not, what
could be done to improve the situation?
4.2 Implications of USDOC’s insistence on adverse ﬁnding before
recalculating margins, retrospective remedies, and continuing breach
The USDOC announced it would cease zeroing in original investigations on
27 December 2006; the effective date of this ﬁnal modiﬁcation was 16 January
2007. Since that time, in each of the WTO disputes involving zeroing in OI
(all commenced before the change in policy), the US has not contested the claims.
Nevertheless, the US has insisted that the WTO DSB make a ruling in each case
41US–Zeroing (Korea), para. 7.10.
42 Although the simplicity of the case certainly meant that the time requested for the proceedings was
shorter than would otherwise have been. For example, after consulting the parties, the Panel decided not to
hold a second substantive meeting with the parties. See para. 1.6 of the Panel Report. The Panel stage thus
lasted eight months rather than the usual average of 14.7 months. See Henrik Horn, Louise Johannesson,
and Petros C. Mavroidis (2011), ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement System (1995–2010): Some Descriptive
Statistics’, 45:6 Journal of World Trade, 1107–1138.
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before it recalculates margins that were originally computed before the policy
change.
From a political viewpoint, the continuous involvement of the US in zeroing
cases can be explained in the following way. Domestic action, which is rational
(assuming the compliance with international obligations contributes to the
broad domestic-welfare outcome expected from them) but unpopular (because
it decreases the welfare of well-deﬁned and organized stakeholders), becomes
possible if governments present it as an inescapable international commitment. As
Mavroidis notes:
one cannot exclude the cases where recourse to dispute settlement is done on
commitment grounds; the defendant prefers to lose and comply using theWTO as
an excuse for behavior that it would not have otherwise adopted for domestic
political economy reasons.43
With another language, to some extent the continuing litigation on zeroing – nearly
20 WTO Disputes, the sheer majority of which has the US as defendant – could be
explained as an instrument for ‘temporizing’, as Hudec called it:
Thus, any device which helps to smooth the process by which the losers learn
to accept their losses actually makes a valuable contribution to the cohesion, and
thus the well-being, of the entire collective entity. It also keeps politicians in ofﬁce,
of course.44
For all practical purposes, however, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body is paying
the price for the US’s overly narrow implementation of the zeroing decisions. By
way of comparison, in the aftermath of the EC–Bed Linen zeroing dispute, which
also involved model zeroing, the EU offered interested parties affected by zeroing in
other EU cases the opportunity to request a review. It also refrained from applying
model zeroing after the adoption of the AB Report.
The US’s approach has important economic consequences. The US implemen-
tation means that zeroing-inﬂated anti-dumping duties will continue to be assessed
on many existing cases. According to Prusa and Vermulst, there are as many as 200
cases with zero-inﬂated anti-dumping duties that have not yet been recalculated.
Of this set, perhaps 20 have sufﬁciently low margins to warrant bringing a WTO
dispute.45 In effect, the US implementation shifts the cost of compliance on to its
trading partners (via the costs required to pursue the dispute) and to theWTODSB.
From a legal viewpoint, there are two orders of considerations: the ﬁrst on
remedies, the second on breach.
43 Petros C. Mavroidis (2012), ‘A Little Bit Less Conversation and a Little More Action (Property and
Liability Rules in the DSU Review of the WTO)’, draft on ﬁle with the author.
44Hudec, ‘Transcending the Ostensible’, p. 218, supra at note 1.
45 Prusa and Vermulst, ‘United States –Anti-Dumping Measures on Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags
from Thailand’, supra at note 7; and Bown and Prusa, ‘US Anti-Dumping’, supra at note 3, argue that only
cases where removing zeroing will result in de minimis margins are suitable WTO disputes.
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First, as we have noted above, time plays in favor of the defendant in the WTO
DSU. The US narrow approach to implementation to the repeated (eventually
accepted) condemnation of zeroing methodology by the WTO DS underlies this
case and mirrors the entrenched and (among Members) virtually universal view
that WTO DS’s rulings are for the future only and that remedies do not have any
retrospective or retroactive effect.46
Although the suggestion that remedies could have some retrospective effect is
highly controversial in the WTO,47 in no less than ﬁve cases GATT Panel Reports
in the ﬁeld of anti-dumping and countervailing duties retroactive remedies were
imposed.48 We agree with Mavroidis’s assessment of the perverse disincentive a
weak remedy has for illegally imposed anti-dumping duties:
what is the incentive for a WTO Member to respect the anti-dumping disciplines
if it knows that, at worst, it risks seeing itself obliged to stop some four years
down the road imposing duties that were illegally rendered in the ﬁrst place?49
As noted by Prusa and Vermulst:
the prospective nature of WTO remedies limits their effectiveness, as the US
zeroing saga abundantly shows.50
One certainly can question whether each and every case concerning anti-dumping
duties based on zeroing methodology involves the issue of retrospectiveness.
It may be argued that for certain administrative investigations that are not
concluded − for example, when the duty or liability has only been provisionally
46 For an extensive discussion, see Petros C. Mavroidis (2000), ‘Remedies in the WTO Legal System:
Between a Rock and a Hard Place’, 11:4 European Journal of International Law, 763–813; Piet Eeckhout
(2009), ‘Remedies and Compliance’, in Daniel Bethlehem, Donald McRae, Rodney Neufeld, and Isabelle
Van Damme (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Trade Law, Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press, pp. 437–459.
47 A good example is the reaction to the Panel Report in Australia – Subsidies Provided to Producers
and Exporters of Automotive Leather –Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, WT/
DS126/RW and Corr.1, adopted 11 February 2000, DSR 2000:III, 1189. See the DSB’s discussion on the
adoption of the Panel Report, WT/DSB/M/75.
48 The ﬁrst case wasNew Zealand v. Finland (the Transformers case). On these GATT cases see Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann (1993), ‘International Competition Rules for the GATT/WTO World Trade and Legal
System’, 27:6 Journal of World Trade, 35–86; Norio Komuro and Edwin Vermulst (1997), ‘Anti-Dumping
Disputes in the GATT/WTO: Navigating Dire Straits’, 31:1 Journal of World Trade, 5–43. The political
difﬁculties ensuing a ﬁnding that a retroactive repayment of illegally imposed duties can impose clearly
come out from the Panel Report, Guatemala –Deﬁnitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey Portland
Cement from Mexico, WT/DS156/R, adopted 17 November 2000, DSR 2000:XI, 5295, paras. 9.6–9.7.
See Petros C. Mavroidis, Patrick A. Messerlin, and Jasper M. Wauters (2008), The Law and Economics of
Contingent Protection in the WTO, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing,
pp. 258–260.
49Mavroidis, ‘A Little Bit Less Conversation and a Little More Action’, supra at note 43.
50 Prusa and Vermulst, ‘United States –Anti-Dumping Measures on Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags
from Thailand’, supra at note 7.
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determined − there is no need to talk of the retrospective effect, since the effect of
the declaration of illegality would affect a pending situation.
Whatever it may be, it is reasonable to assume that, if WTO remedies have had
some retrospective effects, the US would have more quickly changed its domestic
laws so as to end this long zeroing litigation.51 Further, it looks intuitive that, if this
remedial possibility would have been available and the US had not changed its
policy, we would have had even more zeroing complaints against the US.
Secondly, it may be asked whether the narrow approach to implementation to
WTO rulings ﬁnding the zeroing methodology illegal may constitute a case of
breach ‘having a continuing character’.
In public international law, this breach ‘extends over the entire period during
which the act continues and remains not in conformity with the international
obligation’.52 As noted over and over above, the fact that US laws, by providing
zeroing as the methodology to calculate dumping, were illegal under WTO has
been repeatedly found by Panels and the Appellate Body. This was not contested
but acknowledged by the US itself. It could therefore be argued that the breach of
the relevant WTO laws has continued over time (by applying the same policy to the
same and different investigations) and, for what matters to Korea, was still lasting
in the anti-dumping investigations at issue in DS 402.
Bown and Sykes underlined the implications of the initial piecemeal approach of
the WTO rulings on zeroing, comparing it with a more expansive approach that
might have clariﬁed the full scope of permissibility and impermissibility of zeroing
across all of the procedures of the anti-dumping process in which it might be
used.53 The deference of this approach can be understood. One of its negative
implications, however, has been to blur the continuity of lack of compliance
of US laws with WTO law. In more recent cases (US–Continued Zeroing (EC),54
US–Zeroing (Japan),55 and US–Zeroing (EC)),56 the complainants made very
expansive claims against the practice. The WTO AB’s decisions now imply that the
practice of zeroing is inconsistent except under exceptional circumstances.57
51 See the negotiating proposal of Canada, TN/RL/GEN/37, which inter alia suggests that, in case of an
anti-dumping or countervailing-duty measure found WTO law-inconsistent, the relevant Member ‘should
be obliged to apply the compliant measure to all past entries and, where application of the compliant
measure yields lower duty liability, to refund all excess anti-dumping and/or countervailing duties collected
pursuant to the original (WTO-inconsistent) measure’.
52 Article 14 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility. See
James Crawford (2002), The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility
Introduction, Text and Commentaries, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 135–140.
53 Bown and Sykes, ‘The Zeroing Issue’, supra at note 10.
54United States –Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology, WT/DS350.
55United States –Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews, WT/DS322.
56United States –Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins (‘Zeroing’),
WT/DS 294.
57 This discussion is based on Bown and Prusa, ‘US Anti-Dumping’, supra at note 3.
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Although the practical implications of a ruling of continuing breach are not
substantial, its clear and symbolic value and signal cannot be underestimated.
4.3 The policy change of February 2012: all is well that ends well?
Zeroing has also been an issue for duty calculations in periodic ‘administrative
reviews’. Under US AD law, the USDOC will, upon request, periodically conduct
‘administrative reviews’ of an AD order for purposes of (i) calculating the
exact dumping margin for each exporter on entries covered by that review, and
(ii) recalculating the duty deposit rate for future entries. Reviews are carried out
indeﬁnitely until the AD order is either completely or partially revoked. Typically,
either domestic ﬁrms or foreign exporters will request a review within the ﬁrst few
years after the order was imposed.
The December 2006 policy change only affected zeroing in OI. The US only
agreed to stop zeroing on administrative reviews in February 2012.58 The relevant
timetable reads:
The Final Rule and Final Modiﬁcation for Reviews will be effective and
applicable to all reviews pending before the Department for which the
preliminary results are issued after April 16, 2012. The Department will further
apply the Final Rule and Final Modiﬁcation of Reviews to all sunset reviews
pending before the Department for which either the preliminary results
or expedited ﬁnal results of sunset review are issued after April 16, 2012. This
methodology will be used in implementing the ﬁndings of the WTO panels
in US-Zeroing (EC), US-Zeroing (Japan), US-Stainless Steel (Mexico), and
US-Continued Zeroing (EC), with respect to any antidumping duty proceedings
conducted pursuant to section 129 of the URAA. This methodology will also be
applicable to any reviews currently discontinued by the Department if such
reviews are continued after April 16, 2012 by reason of a ﬁnal and conclusive
judgment of a US Court.
This policy change should result in most countries simply requesting an
administrative review rather than pursuing WTO litigation since a successful
WTO ruling essentially just forces the US to perform a non-zeroing calculation.59
Since, however, as the zeroing saga shows, compliance withWTO rulings is often
erratic, one cannot exclude the fact that Member governments will continue WTO
litigation under Article 21.5 of the DSU claiming lack of full compliance as to
refund of duties after the ‘Reasonable Period’ ended.
58 ‘Antidumping Proceedings: Calculation of the Weighted-Average Dumping Margin and Assessment
Rate in Certain Antidumping Duty Proceedings; Final Modiﬁcation’, Federal Register, 77:30 (14 February
2012), pp. 8101–8114.
59 The only difference is that the margins are calculated for different periods of time. A recalculated OI
margin would be based on a different (earlier) set of transactions than an administrative-review margin
calculation. This timing difference is unlikely to generate a WTO dispute.
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4.4 Unliquidated cash deposits: taking WTO DSU recommendations
seriously
The US is unique in that it uses a retrospective system to compute duties while
most other WTO members use a prospective system. Bown and Prusa argue that
the differences in the duty-assessment systems in the EC and US partly explain
why they responded differently to the WTO rulings.60 In the prospective system,
the dumping margin is established on the basis of the original investigation. In the
retrospective system used by the United States, the dumping margin calculated in
the initial investigation only establishes the deposit rate. The actual dumping
margin is established during an administrative review.
An issue that emerged in the implementation phase was the appropriate way
to handle cash deposits that had been collected (based on zeroing methodology)
but had not yet been liquidated. The US will not implement with regard to what it
considers a previous violation. The US believes it is sufﬁcient to abandon zeroing on
a forward-looking basis and that this implementation is enough to comply. The
US’s position is particularly problematic in this case.
For SSPC and SSSSC, there had been no shipments for many years and thus
there were no deposits that could potentially be refunded. However, for diamond
sawblades there were unliquidated cash deposits and these deposits could be
potentially refunded. Recall that the US changed its policy regarding zeroing in
OI in December 2006. Due to legal appeals, the cash-deposit order on sawblades
began in January 2009, only after the US Court of International Trade remanded
the USITC’s negative injury determination. In other words, the US began to collect
AD deposits over two years after it ceased zeroing in original investigations.
While unliquidated deposits were not in the scope of the dispute, Korea
requested that the US refund the unliquidated deposits but the US refused. The
instance of refusal to refund the unliquidated cash deposits is another clear example
of the US’s narrow approach to implementation of WTO zeroing decisions.
Certainly, a not-too-narrow reading of the standard recommendation to bring
the measures (i.e., ﬁnal determinations, amended ﬁnal determinations, anti-
dumping duty orders, and amended anti-dumping duty orders) in conformity
with its obligations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement does involve the
repayment of sums collected on the basis of those orders and of a calculation that
has been found illegal. In other words, there are no reasons to disturb the principle
of no ultra petita. The refund of sums collected on the basis of a methodology that
has been expressly found to be illegal is a reasonable and direct consequence of the
ruling of illegality.
60 Bown and Prusa, ‘US Anti-Dumping’, pp. 373–374, supra at note 3. This would depend on the fact
that the retrospective system may amplify the effect of zeroing on dumping margins thus possibly
explaining the US’s resistance to implement WTO rulings.
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The US refusal to refund the unliquidated cash deposits may also represent a
good example of the weakness of the WTO DSU at the remedy level, which has
been noted above. If WTO remedies were retroactive, it can reasonably be argued
that the US would not be able to refuse repayment. But, even without invoking
the far-reaching and emotion-stirring notion of retroactivity, it could be argued that
since, in the US retrospective system to compute duties, cash deposits are collected
only on the basis of the provisional determination of the initial investigation
and do not reﬂect the actual dumping margin (which is established only during
an administrative review), the procedure would still be current and subject to
review.
5. Concluding comments: how strong is the law coming out from the WTO DSU?
The Panel’s decision in US–Zeroing (Korea) does not have signiﬁcant legal or
economic interest with respect to the issue of zeroing. In its decision, the Panel
simply restated long-standing (and numerous) Appellate Body views on the
inconsistency of zeroing with Article 2.4.2 of the ADA.
After at least 20 disputes and more than 13 years of WTO litigation which
repeatedly conﬁrmed the illegality of zeroing, it comes as welcome news that the
US ﬁnally decided to also stop zeroing in administrative reviews. Hopefully, for
the health of the WTO DSU, this long-simmering irritant has come to an end.
What starkly emerges from this zeroing-litigation saga is a more general
consideration of the weakness in the WTO DSU system and of the ability of
one country to take advantage of it. Important questions can be made. Why do
countries litigate although the law is clear and the facts undisputed? How much
stronger is domestic politics than international legal obligations? To what extent
does the current WTO DSU system reﬂect or favor this state of affairs? And,
more importantly, what could be done to prevent, in the future, long-lasting foot-
dragging like that witnessed with the US and zeroing? Would broader ﬁndings that
any continuity of the illegality be established make any difference? Would
complainants ask for this, and would Panels and the Appellate Body promptly
respond to the call? Further, would a change of view on the lack of retrospective
effects of remedies in the WTO help? In public international law, we do have
retrospective remedies since the Chorzow Factories decision of the International
Court of Justice in 1929. Why is this so difﬁcult in theWTO? Is it because theWTO
DSU is lex specialis to the general rules of State responsibility? Or is there any other
reason that makes countries reluctant to be subject to more robust remedies in the
WTO? Although certainly politically sensitive, would a statement that duties
calculated on the basis of zeroing should be recalculated and any sum levied repaid
be so revolutionary? In a word − how binding and strong is the law coming out
from a WTO dispute? And – crucially – how binding and strong do its Members
want it to be?
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